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As we venture further into the 21st century, it becomes much clearer that hardware security is at the forefront of
many challenges that we face today in ensuring that data is protected. “Keys” (a sequence of bits) can be used to
unlock pieces of data and is a concept that is pervasive throughout cryptography, but storage in memory makes this
sole method nonviable. To make the approach more practical, one can dynamically generate a key through a Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF). PUFs are circuit primitives that use intrinsic variations of microchips created during the
manufacturing process to generate a unique “fingerprint” for each chip. We simulated several di↵erent PUF designs
on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) board to determine how changes to a starting design can a↵ect the
reliability, randomness, and uniqueness of these IDs. We propose two schemes, a parallel and a serial scheme for a
ring oscillator (RO) based PUF. The parallel scheme is a useful benchmark for other designs, and the serial scheme
uses much less hardware than other RO PUF designs. The serial scheme is not as random, reliable, or unique as the
parallel scheme, but it creates input-output pairs with much less area.
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Hardware security provides protection against attacks on the physical side of technology. Consequently, hardware
security primitives are strong circuit building blocks that prevent hardware attacks. Designers need lightweight and
cost-e↵ective methods to protect and verify their circuit’s integrity. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a robust
solution to combat the aforementioned issues. The fundamental concept that PUFs rely on happens at the manufac-
turing step. In manufacturing, it is impossible for all processes to be applied uniformly across the entire wafer, which
leads to some small random variations in all Integrated Circuits (ICs). PUFs use these random attributes introduced
during manufacturing to generate unique IDs and keys for authentication. Since process variation is unavoidable and
uncontrollable, a PUF implements a function unknown to both the designer and the attacker, and this function di↵ers
between chips. While two chips that come o↵ the End of Line (EoL) may be functionally equivalent, they will have
physical characteristics that are di↵erent (i.e. Load/Line Capacitance, parasitic, etc.) as a result of process variations.
These physical characteristics can be used to uniquely characterize each IC that comes o↵ the line. PUF input-output
pairs are referred to as challenge-response pairs (CRPs).
A ring oscillator is an odd number of inverter gates connected serially in a ring. This configuration causes each
node in the circuit to oscillate between a logic high and logic low. The frequency of oscillation is dependent on the
delay of the inverters that make up the ring oscillator. Since every ring oscillator has a unique delay, it can be used
to uniquely identify a part. A ring oscillator PUF (RO PUF) is a type of delay-based PUF that, with n bits, has two
2
n
2 -to-1 multiplexer (Mux) with 2
n
2 ring oscillators per mux. A counter is used at each of the mux outputs and a race
arbiter outputs a logic high or a logic low, depending on which ring oscillator is faster.
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Figure 1.1: A Traditional RO PUF Schematic
There are three main performance metrics that are used to evaluate a PUF: reliability, uniqueness and randomness.
Reliability is the measure of how repeatable the PUF can produce consistent CRPs under various conditions. This is
measured by subtracting the average number of bit di↵erences for all CRPs from 100%. In the equation below, n is
the number of bits, m is the total number of times the 2n CRPs were tested. Tm is the time of the final response, RT1 is
the response of the first run, RT2 is the response of the second run, and Rt is response of run t.






) ⇥ 100% (1.1)
Ideally, each PUF will produce a unique set of CRPs which is independent from all other PUFs. In other words,
two PUFs given the same challenge should produce a di↵erent response. This is measured using the inter-Hamming
distance of the design. The inter-Hamming distance is the number of bit di↵erences between two PUFs (the same
design on two di↵erent parts), which is ideally n2 . In the equation below, k is the number of di↵erent parts tested, Ri










Randomness is a measure of how unpredictable the output is. A PUF that has response bits of mostly 1s is not as
random as a PUF whose response has an even distribution of 1s and 0s. This is measured using the Shannon Entropy





pi log2 pi (1.3)
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1.2 Motivation
As technology is increasingly accelerating at a high rate, security is becoming a more common issue with attacks
happening at all layers of the software-hardware stack. While many are concerned about software security, this leaves
hardware security in a state that is much to be desired. Even if the software security implemented for a specific
application is “robust,” it is only secure as the hardware on which it sits. Hardware Trojans (or manipulation of
circuitry in an integrated circuit) are methods for attackers to gather sensitive information/data as attacks on the “lower
portion of the stack” (closer to the hardware) have become more and more ubiquitous. Recent examples include
Meltdown and Spectre, two hardware vulnerabilities on Intel’s processors. While these attacks are not necessarily at
the bottom-most level of the software-hardware stack, they demonstrate that every point in the stack is vulnerable and
that a system is only a secure as its weakest point.
In recent years, chip manufacturing has been moved outside the United States, while Intellectual Property (IP)
designing has largely remained inside the US. ICs must go through a long and arduous journey from the silicon
foundry to the products we take for granted in our everyday life. During shipping ,parts have the potential to fall into
the wrong hands, and at the same time, it’s also possible that the counterfeit ICs are used instead of legitimate ICs.
The fake chips that arise from counterfeiting practices are harmful to both the industry and the consumer - the original
designer loses money and credibility as the consumer attempts to use a chip with higher failure rates and a shorter
lifespan. Some counterfeit parts even make their way into applications like nuclear submarines or the braking systems
in high speed trains. When a designer sends their schematic overseas, they should be cautious with their design.
Did the foundry overproduce chips to reverse engineer and sell the design to competitors? Did they add in hardware
Trojans to leak/destroy protected data? How can a designer ensure the chips are authentic? And if another individual
purchase one of the ICs, how do they know they are receiving a genuine one and not a counterfeit chip? Designers
need some mechanism to guarantee that their design remains authentic after production and unusable to counterfeiters.
These questions pose a need to both verify that the parts used are legitimate before installation, and ‘lock’ the part
so that intellectual property (IP) is not stolen. A PUF is able to e↵ectively accomplish these tasks since it can, ideally,
create a unique identifier for authentication that can be verified before use or installation. A PUF’s output cannot be
cloned because a specific PUF’s output cannot be determined before the chip is manufactured.
3
Chapter 2
Statement of Problem and Objectives
2.1 Statement of Problem
Counterfeiting and IP piracy has increased since silicon production and product manufacturing has mostly shifted
abroad. Counterfeit parts are typically show problems well after the part has been installed, where it can be laborious
to replace and dangerous to not. A method is needed to combat this maliciousness and protect both the individuals
who may accidentally use counterfeit products as well as the intellectual property itself.
An RO PUF is e↵ective at creating a random function that is both unique and reliable, and so it is ideal for the
purposes of authentication. The idea of an RO PUF has been explored before, however there are weaknesses with
certain challenges. This shortcoming means a bit selection algorithm must be used to select the most secure CRPs.
This is ine cient as it can severely limit the input space for a PUF.
2.2 Objectives
We aimed to design, simulate, compare and post-process the data of a delay-based PUF on a Field-Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA) as a proof of concept test for a scrambler block implemented in the challenge bus to eliminate the
“bad” challenges.
Since this was a proof of concept, the PUF was only 8 bits wide. Two schemes, one serial and one parallel, will
be tested in order to compare their performance to each other. Both RO PUF schemes were designed with Verilog and
implemented on the FPGA using Vivado, as well as parameterized according to the aforementioned three main PUF
metrics: reliability, uniqueness, and randomness.
This project did not include the physical manufacturing of the circuit, since IC tape-out is very expensive, and as
students, we are not at liberty to make those kinds of purchases. Furthermore, it is not feasible to manufacture the
system as the PUF in an IC is a sub-block that is meant to protect other IP, of which we have none.
Since the PUF was simulated on an FPGA, this project did not include voltage variation as increasing the supply
voltage (typically a 5V USB input) does not stress the design, but instead only stresses the on-board voltage regulator,
4
which we did not design.
Initially, there were plans to test the performance of the PUF under di↵erent environmental conditions by using
a Thermostream to change the ambient operating temperature, however the COVID-19 pandemic and observation of
shelter-in-place restrictions made these tests impossible. Furthermore, the design on the FPGA was to be stress tested
by running it at a high temperature (around 85˚C) for extended periods of time, but similarly, this was not possible due
to the COVID-19 restrictions.
5
Chapter 3
Project Plan and Methodology
3.1 Project Plan
1. Fall Quarter
• We began our research on Physical Unclonable Functions by reading through the current literature.
• We looked at many schemes from which to draw inspiration. From these, we designed two new schemes
to increase randomness and improve common weaknesses in RO PUFs.
• We designed blocks in Verilog like ring oscillators, multiplexers, arbiters, shift registers, etc. To test these,
we wrote and used SystemVerilog testbenches. These were verified using VCS.
• We worked on integrating subsystems in Verilog using the above blocks.
• All the verilog blocks and integrated systems were verified and synthesized using Vivado.
2. Winter Quarter
• We designed our testing infrastructure.
• We began implementation and initial placement on our FPGA (Xilinx Spartan 7 on the Arty S7 board).
We debugged many of our issues in this step since we could not simulate the physical di↵erences.
• We wrote Python scripts for automating the data collection.
• We began data collection for our parallel scheme.
• We wrote more scripts to provide quantitative analysis on the collected data (the responses) via the three
metrics of reliability, uniqueness, and randomness.
3. Spring Quarter
• We designed our scrambler block for the serial scheme.
• We integrated our serial scheme into the testing infrastructure.
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• We made design adjustments and continued processing data.
3.2 Methodology
Our goal was to compare metrics for both schemes, and draw conclusions from that. We measured three core PUF
metrics for both schemes: reliability, uniqueness, and randomness, and compared the performance of the two schemes.
In order to collect data, we created a list of all 256 possible 8-bit challenges, and passed them to the PUF se-
quentially. We read out one ‘set’ of 256 responses, and stored them in a text file to be analyzed later using Python
scripts.
Our parallel scheme was to be used mostly as a benchmark. Since each output bit uses independent hardware, we
expected this scheme to be highly unique and random. We expected the serial scheme to not be as random or unique,
but still desirable because of its much lower area overhead.
3.2.1 Tools Used
Software Tools
We used a number of software tools to design and test our PUF designs.
• Synopsys VCS - We used VCS to write the initial Register Transfer Level Verilog Code and run early stage
simulations. To verify each block, VCS has a digital waveform viewer during the simulation step that we used
to make sure signals toggle properly under various conditions at specific times.
• Xilinx Vivado Design Suite 2019 - We used Vivado to run more thorough simulations as well as refine and place
on our FPGA. It is an excellent tool that comes with specific placement capabilities that allow us to simulate the
creation of di↵erent chips in manufacturing through placing designs in di↵erent slices.
Hardware Tools
To physically manifest the process variations, we used various hardware products:
• Digilent Arty S7 board with Xilinx Spartan 7 FPGA - Pat McGuire from Xilinx was kind enough to supply us
with three of these boards to simulate the circuit itself placed on silicon die.
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Figure 3.1: Digilent Arty S7 Board
• Raspberry Pi 4 - We used a Raspberry Pi to automate the sending of di↵erent challenges and monitor/record the
responses.
Figure 3.2: Raspberry Pi 4 with GPIO Pinout





As mentioned previously, we designed two schemes of a Ring-Oscillator Physical Unclonable Function that takes 8
bits as input and gives an 8-bit output.
4.1 Parallel Scheme
The parallel scheme is the simplest way to achieve more output bits, at the expense of hardware. Our proposed design
needs 32 ROs for a single response bit, which even at 8 bits wide is quite area-expensive. Figure 4.1 shows a sub-block
that is very similar to a typical Ring-Oscillator PUF. By placing 8 of these circuits in parallel, we now need 256 ROs,
and the corresponding counters and MUXes to go with them. This circuit was used mostly as a benchmark for the
serial scheme, since ideally there should be no correlation between partitioned ROs as described. This could change
in layout, if these blocks were placed very close to each other, but can be corrected by a good layout designer - it is
safe to assume this design creates responses with high entropy. This parallel scheme also has the advantage of speed.
Our parallel scheme only needs each counter module to run once to generate an output. The number of ring oscillators
per MUX scales with the size of our input challenge, and to generate a response longer than one bit, several of these
schemes are placed in parallel and fed the same challenge. Figure 4.2 shows the overall parallel block diagram.
Figure 4.1: Parallel Sub-Block Diagram: 8-bit challenge resulting in a 1-bit response
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Figure 4.2: Overall Parallel Block Diagram: 8-bit challenge resulting in a 8-bit response by collating sub-blocks
In short, this scheme should be very random and unique, but uses a lot of area to do so. As an added bonus, this
scheme also generates its responses very quickly.
4.2 Serial Scheme
In general, the main drawback of a ring oscillator based PUF is its high area overhead for a single output bit. Figure
4.3 shows our proposed serial design; the original challenge feeds into a scrambler, which will serially output eight
di↵erent challenges into the same group of ROs, producing 8 output bits for a little area. Current serial PUF imple-
mentations often use a counter instead of a scrambler. While this does generate multiple output bits, the counter is
linear, and so creates highly correlated ’adjacent’ outputs. Since 0 and 1 are ’adjacent’ in the counter, along with 1 and
2, 2 and 3, and so on, the responses generated by adjacent or closely adjacent challenges will share many response bits.
The challenge of all 0’s shares seven response bits in common with the challenge of all 1’s and any two adjacent input
challenges will always share seven output bits. Our first proposed suggestion is to replace this counter with a linear
feedback shift register (LFSR), a common circuit used for pseudo random number generation. The LFSR works much
like a counter, except it runs through the numbers in a pseudo-random but predictable order. The adjacency problem
with the counter appears to have been solved - except for the fact that the LFSR is still a linear circuit. The adjacencies
were not removed but just shifted. If our LFSR always goes from, for example, ’54’ to ’205’, then the responses for
the challenges ’54’ and ’205’ will share seven bits.
We designed a scrambler circuit which uses some nonlinear component to eliminate this issue. Our scrambler
circuit contains an extra 8-bit register in the LFSR to store the original challenge. The first output of the scrambler will
always be the original challenge, and then every subsequent scrambler output will be the bitwise XOR of the original
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challenge with the next LFSR value. Now, if our original challenge is ’54’, the output will be 255 XOR’ed with 54,
which here is 251. This extra component removes the predictable adjacencies and will lead to less correlation. Our
proposed serial scheme has a low area cost, and also uses less power. It incorporates a scrambler block which
further increases unpredictability before signals are actually placed onto the MUX select lines.
Figure 4.3: Serial Scheme: Notice that removing yellow-outlined modules is the same as a parallel sub-block
In short, this design will not be as random or unique as the parallel scheme, but requires significantly less area.
4.3 Data Collection Infrastructure
Our actual hardware setup is picture below in Figure 4.4. We used male to male wires to connect both systems to each
other via GPIO pins. The GPIO interface allows the Raspberry Pi to send bits into the FPGA via eight sending pins
and receive the responses via a separate set of eight receiving pins.
Figure 4.4: The Experimental Setup to Automate Data Collection
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A text file was created of all possible challenges with 8 bits. In this file, we enumerated all 256 possibilities starting
with all 0s and ending with all 1s, separated by newline. The file was then parsed line-by-line to isolate each challenge
to send to the Arty S7. The Raspberry Pi and Arty S7 data collection configuration executes as follows:
1. The Raspberry Pi will initialize the eight challenge pins for the Arty S7
2. The Raspberry Pi will set the ’reset’ pin high momentarily to reset the PUF
3. When the race arbitration is completed, the Arty S7 will output the response bits and pull the ’done’ signal high.
4. The Raspberry Pi will record the response to a CSV file
5. Repeat steps 1 through 4 for the next challenge until all 256 challenges have been sent
6. Repeat steps 1 through 5 for the desired number of data sets.
Figure 4.5 below shows this cycle in a state-diagram form.
Figure 4.5: State Diagram Dictating Control Logic of Raspberry Pi
This interface was used instead of a serial communication protocol such as I2C in order to maximize data collection
with a limited period if time. Instead of sending each bit one after the other, this sends and receives them all once
allowing us to run tests faster. One 1000 data set run with a 23-bit counter took around four hours to complete with
our setup allowing us to gather ample data to analyze. While it does require more wires, there were more than enough




5.1 Results and Validations
This section demonstrate the results of two di↵erent schemes (serial and parallel). We also validate our result using 3
di↵erent functional metrics.
5.1.1 Evaluation Metrics
We used Python and the libraries CSV and NumPy for most of our data manipulation. As defined earlier, our three
main metrics are uniqueness, reliability, and randomness.
Reliability
is a measure of how often the same challenge outputs the same response. The same chip, when fed the same response,
should always output the same challenge. This may not always be the case if: 1) the two RO frequencies being
compared are already very similar, or if 2) the PUF is not stable over temperature or voltage variations. Consider a
chip that produces responses RT1 for challenge C at time T1 and produces the response RT2 for the same challenge at
time T2. A reliable PUF means that RT1 and RT2 are equal.






) ⇥ 100% (5.1)
The designed PUF fulfills all our reliability requirements. Our proposed RO PUF results under reliability is shown
in Figure 5.1. On average, it is 99.65% reliable, which indicates that the same challenge should almost always produce
the same response. This value is on par with other research done on RO PUFs such as (1) and (4). From our serial
scheme the results results are shown in Figure 5.2. The average reliability is 99.45%. Reliability increases when the
di↵erences in the frequencies are higher. Since the parallel scheme has more ring oscillators to choose from it is more
likely to have higher di↵erences in the frequencies.
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Figure 5.1: Parallel Scheme Reliability Results for 1000 Run Data Set
Figure 5.2: Serial Scheme Reliability Results for 1000 Run Data Set
Uniqueness
A unique PUF should have di↵erent behavior on each chip since the random process variation will be inherently
di↵erent for each printed IC. The best metric for this is inter-Hamming distance. Inter-Hamming distance measures
how far apart two responses generated by the same challenge on two di↵erent PUFs are. To measure uniqueness, we
can implement the same PUF on multiple FPGAs and examine the di↵erences between the responses. Also, we can
choose di↵erent lookup tables (LUTs) for implementation on the same FPGA to have e↵ectively di↵erent PUFs.










The uniqueness results of our purposed parallel RO PUF is shown in Figure 5.3. The uniqueness results of the
serial RO PUF are show in Figure 5.4. Our parallel scheme has a mean inter-hamming distance of 46.4% and the serial
14
scheme has a mean inter-hamming distance of 62.7% which is very high. Since we have 8 bits this means that about 5
bits are changing on average.
Figure 5.3: Parallel Scheme Interhamming Distance Results
Figure 5.4: Serial Scheme Interhamming Distance Results
Randomness
A random RO PUF has challenge-response pairs that cannot be predicted unless the timing delays in every RO are
characterized. Knowing any one CRP should provide no information about any other CRP. Calculating “entropy” of




pi log2 pi (5.3)
Our average Shannon Entropy for each response averaged across all 256 possibilities is about 0.9253 per bit for
the parallel scheme. While this number would ideally be higher, the design has strong unpredictability. For the serial
15
scheme the average Shannon Entropy is about 0.7963. This makes sense that we see a higher Shannon Entropy from
the parallel scheme as we are using more ring oscillators which will give use more randomness. Every new piece of




6.1 Inability to Simulate Randomness
In the early stages of simulating our designs in Synopsys VCS, there was no way to simulate randomness in the
hardware as the “randomness” is introduced into the system as a function of its physicality. It is possible to manually
specify delays in each inverter, though this is an infeasible solution if each simulation is to be repeated multiple times
since it would involve manually changing the delay of each instantiated inverter (in the parallel scheme, there are close
to 4000 inverters). The more practical solution is to synthesize the circuit on the FPGA and use the physicality of the
hardware in the gate array. Monte Carlo simulations are another option that we considered. However, as much as it is
desirable to perform this comprehensive type of simulation (where we would also be able to capture PUF performance
even at various temperatures), it is not possible to carry out these simulations on a logic circuit.
6.2 Hardware Description Language (HDL) Code Optimization
Oftentimes, when using Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools such as Vivado or VCS, optimizers are important
process in the synthesis step since they erase logic that is not being used as well as simplify the circuit. In the case
of ring oscillators, this is especially problematic since all ring oscillators can be simplified down to either a single
inverter or bu↵er. In our design, we defined an ring oscillator as a NAND gate connected to 14 inverters as shown in
Figure 6.1. When the the NAND gate’s enable is high, the gate e↵ectively turns into an additional inverter resulting
15 inverters. Logically, the optimizer believes that 15 inverters is equivalent to a single inverter. Consequently, the
circuit is condensed down to that single inverter to get rid of delay. Figure 6.2 below shows this simplified RO. While
the optimizer is correct in making this simplification, this does not work for our purpose since we want the delay.
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Figure 6.1: Verilog for Optimized Ring Oscillator
Figure 6.2: Optimized Ring Oscillator
In order to make the other inverters manifest, a small but fundamental change must be introduced and is tool-
specific for Vivado (but can be replicated in other synthesis tools like Synopsys’ Design Compiler with di↵erent
syntax). A “dont touch” directive is introduced in each wire when writing the Verilog which allows the full RO to
be realized. Figure 6.3 shows the new Verilog with the “dont touch” directive outlined in red. Figure 6.4 shows the
corresponding full ring oscillator with all 14 inverters with one NAND gate synthesized by adding the directive.
Figure 6.3: Verilog for a Full Ring Oscillator with All Inverters
Figure 6.4: A Full Ring Oscillator with All Inverters
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6.3 Automated Data Collection
During the creation of the testing infrastructure, we made a number of design decisions. Despite later settling on
the Raspberry Pi as the tool of choice, we originally decided on using an Arduino to automate the collection of data.
The Arduino has a number of benefits. Firstly, it is extremely close to the hardware operating in C allowing greater
visibility into the bitstream sent and received. Secondly, we have tight control over electrical signals sent since it plays
well with bread-boarding. Despite these benefits, the Arduino’s close proximity to the hardware also gave us a number
of challenges. First and foremost, the serial port was unwieldy. Opening the connection requires the computer as well
as the Arduino to open the same channel. Since timing would be an issue, we used two Arduinos, one for sending
challenges and one for receiving responses. The parsing of our eight-bit grey code needed multiple conversions
between ASCII to its corresponding bit (0 or 1) and ultimately a GPIO LOW/HIGH and vice versa. The Arduino
also outputs 5V which is too high for our FPGA. Finally, to make the automation worthwhile, a high baud rate was
required. However, at baud rates upward of 192000, we saw bits dropped during transmission. These disadvantages
pushed us to adopt the Raspberry Pi.
6.4 Timing
During the initial bringup of our automated testing environment, one of the issues we encountered was Timing. The
first few inspections led us to believe that the “done” signal coming from the FPGA to the Raspberry Pi was never
asserting, despite correct behavior in testbench simulations. We realized that due to timing issues between the FPGA
and Raspberry Pi, the Pi was never latching the done signal. In the world of ASIC design, this problem is the Clock
Domain Crossing (CDC) problem that is commonly encountered. In Figure 6.5, the “done” signal is high for one
period of the FPGA clock. However, since the rate at which the Raspberry Pi is sampling (every rising edge) is too
slow, the Pi only ever registers a LOW since the done signal comes back down by the second rising edge.
Figure 6.5: Bad Timing
We solved this in two manners. The first is to e↵ectively slow the “fpga clk” down to a rate that is equal or slower
than the “pi clk”. If the clock on the FPGA is slower, then data has no problem passing from a slower clock domain
to a faster one. However, this is a rudimentary solution.
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Figure 6.6: Timing that Demonstrates a Handshake
The second method that is more robust is to create a handshake. Therefore, even if data is passed from a fast clock
domain to a slow one, it is guaranteed to be latched. In our case, we changed the “done” signal’s behavior in such a
way that it will assert for forever until a reset is sent through the system, e↵ectively making it a “sticky bit.” Since the
reset is sent from the Raspberry Pi to the FPGA and runs on the Raspberry Pi’s clock, the Pi is guaranteed to see the
assertion. Figure 6.6 above shows the timing diagram with a handshake in place.
6.5 Design Placement
One method to measure the uniqueness metric is to manufacture our design. This is an expensive solution. Another
alternative is to purchase many of the same FPGAs. While this is cheaper, there is a limit to how many we can
purchase. Since Pat McGuire from Xilinx was kind enough to donate three FPGAs to us, we decided to make the
most out of the limited hardware by placing our designs in di↵erent “slices” of each FPGA. This approach e↵ectively
simulates di↵erent chips with the same functional circuit coming o↵ the line. Xilinx Application Engineers were able
to assist us by pointing us to constraint file to specify the specific slices in which we wanted to place our design.
Figure 6.7: Serial Scheme
First Placement
Figure 6.8: Serial Scheme
Second Placement
Figure 6.9: Parallel Scheme
Optimized Placement
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6.6 Reset Logic in the Serial Scheme
When comparing both the parallel and serial schemes, reset logic in the parallel scheme is simplified since it is
handled by the software (refer to Figure 4.5) of the Raspberry Pi. On the other hand, serializing makes this logic more
complicated as resets must be handled internal to the circuit. Resets must happen in a series of steps:
1. Pick a challenge
2. Finish the race between two chosen Ring Oscillators
3. Store resulting bit of race into the bu↵er
4. Increment the scrambler (to get a new comparison of ring oscillators)
5. Reset the counters
6. Repeat steps 2 through 5 an additional 7 times
The ordered list above suggests that these events happen sequentially and that there must be extra logic to dictate
these resets. In our design, we chose to have the bu↵er govern this behavior. Therefore, the bu↵er must be clocked
on some frequency. In our design, we chose to clock the bu↵er module on a 100 MHz clock. We once again ran into
timing issues, specifically with Clock Domain Crossing. Each Ring Oscillator defines a clock domain (as it runs on
its own unique frequency), since the counters are clocked on these ROs, all modules to the left of (and including) the
Race Arbiter reside within that clock domain. Consequently, it is important to ensure that the data flows from the
clock domain defined by the ROs to the bu↵er properly. We chose to use an asynchronous FIFO with a depth of four





In this paper, we proposed parallel and serial RO PUF architectures and have found that these schemes are an e↵ective
method for uniquely characterizing chips. The parallel scheme provides secure authentication at a low cost, but at
a large expense of area overhead. Therefore, it can be used as a standard benchmark by which to evaluate future
PUF designs. The serial scheme drastically reduces overhead at little expense to randomness, but with some speed
trade-o↵s.
7.2 Future Work
7.2.1 Expanded Reliability Testing with Di↵erent Ambient Conditions
Due to the COVID-19 complications, we were unable to test our parts performance at di↵erent ambient temperatures.
Performing these tests will give us a more holistic reliability metric. Furthermore, potential future work includes
conducting a High-Temperature Operating Lifetime (HTOL) test on our design running on the FPGA. An HTOL test
is done by running the part at a high ambient temperature, around 85˚C, for an extended period of time. The Arrhenius
equation can be applied to predict increased aging factor and therefore the performance of the design as the FPGA is
used.
7.2.2 Increasing the PUF Bit Count
This change would take our implementation out of the realm of ’proof-of-concept’ by increasing the width of the PUF
from 8 bits to a more practical value such as 64 bits. An 8-bit PUF identifier can be brute forced, and so increasing
the bit count makes the system more secure overall. This would also require the automated testing to use a serial
communication protocol such as I2C as there will not be enough GPIO pins to accommodate a wider PUF. It should
be noted that testing the PUF and parameterizing it will take significantly longer since the input space explodes and
becomes exponentially larger.
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7.2.3 Collecting More Data
This project is heavily rooted in statistics, and collecting more data will strengthen our claims and provide more
insights. Other than running the PUF for longer, the design can also be tested further by implementing it on di↵erent
types of hardware (i.e. more and di↵erent types of FPGAs). Comparing our proposed scheme with one that has a





Being able to authenticate chips has the ethical considerations of reliability, privacy, and safety. From the customer’s
standpoint, it is very important that they receive the chips that they think they should be receiving and that they are
held up to the reliability standards. An application of a PUF is only sending a signal if the correct response comes
back from the PUF authenticating it. This ensures privacy between devices. No matter the software security that is
being used, if chips have not been authenticated, there no way to completely ensure that the correct chips are receiving
the signals. Lastly, safety is a major concern, because if consumers are using chips that do not hold up to the security
standards, they can have higher failure rates endangering people (i.e. exacerbated by their use in applications where
human lives are at risk). For example, the Pentagon has received many compromised chips that go into systems such
as anti-ballistic missiles. These compromised chips have a higher failure rate than the ones originally intended to be
integrated into the system. This puts public safety in danger in and outside of the US.
8.2 Definition of “Goodness”
In our project, we are attempting to solve a problem that has recently arisen from an increased interest in attacking
hardware in order to gain information or undermine the functionality of a product. Our design of a delay based
physical unclonable function aims to prevent attackers from being able to pirate hardware and to combat counterfeiting.
Therefore, the “goodness” in our intentions can be defined by our desire to secure information and champion privacy
in a world where big data as well as technologies such as RFID that rely on digital IC authentication and small chips
are increasingly becoming more commonplace.
8.3 Ethical Outcomes
We have found a new way to authenticate chips that will hopefully have increased reliability, randomness, and unique-
ness making our PUF more secure. In doing so, we hope to have laid the groundwork for future work on PUFs. Still,
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it is important to perform further testing as prematurely implementing the PUF in today’s hardware security measures
means that it is highly likely that security will be compromised and we will have failed to solve that problems that
PUFs promise to resolve, namely IP piracy and counterfeiting. To mitigate this ethical risk, more extensive testing is
required that is beyond the scope of this project.
8.4 Potential Misuse
There is always potential for misuse of PUFs. Some of these misuse cases can manifest in curious parties attempting
to reverse engineer the PUF and clone function. As a result, our project would no longer be valid, and it would instead
become a security risk.
At the core of hardware security is the relationship between designer and manufacture. Another typical misuse
case would entail the storage of challenge and response pairs. It is possible that the manufacturer may be able to
share these challenge-response pairs with a third party interested in attacking the design. Therefore, it is important to
establish a trustful relationship between designer and manufacturer.
8.5 Conclusions
Hardware security is a growing concern and field since chips are now being fabricated overseas. A way to solve this is
implementing PUFs to authenticate chips. We have been working on a ring oscillator PUF for authentication and are
trying to improve the metrics of reliability, uniqueness, randomness, power, area, and timing. This will help protect
the ethical considerations of safety, reliability, and privacy. Since the project came out successfully, we have made it
easier to authenticate chips which benefits all the ethical considerations. However, we have to ensure that the design
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15% of chips the Pentagon receives are counterfeit [1]
Outline of the Problem
IP Piracy
ICs are manufactured abroad
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PUF Metrics – Quantified
• Reliability: Each chip produces consistent CRPs
• !"#$%&$#$'( = (1 − !
"
∑#$%&%" '( )!",)#+ )×100%
• Uniqueness: Bit differences in two chips’ responses given 
the same challenge






• Randomness: CRPs cannot be predicted
• 73'489( = −∑0$23.!90 log& 90
www.scu.edu/engineering 6
35
S c h o o l  o f  E n g i n e e r i n g









• Project Outcomes and Results




S c h o o l  o f  E n g i n e e r i n g
S A N T A  C L A R A  U N I V E R S I T Y
Project Objectives
Design, simulate, compare and post-process the data of a delay based PUF on an 
FPGA.
This includes:
• Delay-based Ring Oscillator PUF on an FPGA
• 2 different Ring Oscillator schemes
• 8-bit ID for each circuit
• Optimization based on different metrics
• Reliability, Uniqueness, Randomness
• Does not include:
• Manufacturing
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Project Plan
• Research (Fall Quarter)
• Simulate and prototype parallel and serial schemes (Fall 
Quarter)
• Verify and Synthesize on an FPGA (Winter Quarter)
• Data Collection (Winter and Spring Quarter)
• Analysis (Spring Quarter)
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Division of Labor
• Abby Aguirre – Block-level Integrator & Data Scientist
• Tim Lim – System Architect & Test Engineer
• Michael Hall – Block-level Designer
• Jonathan Trinh – RTL Designer & Integrator
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Parallel PUF Block Diagram
www.scu.edu/engineering 12
Parallel Subblock Overall Parallel Scheme
41
S c h o o l  o f  E n g i n e e r i n g
S A N T A  C L A R A  U N I V E R S I T Y




S c h o o l  o f  E n g i n e e r i n g
S A N T A  C L A R A  U N I V E R S I T Y
Serial Scheme Design
www.scu.edu/engineering 14
• Circular shift register
• Lots of ‘bad’ challenges
• Counter
• No bad challenges, but adjacency issues
• LFSR and scrambler
• Shuffles adjacencies and removes them
• Still vulnerable to netlist attacks
8-bit LFSR.
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Design Challenges
• Inability to simulate
• HDL Code Optimization
• Automated Data Collection
• Timing
• Design Placement
• Reset Logic in the Serial Scheme
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Timing
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Raspberry Pi never latches the done signal!
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Make the “done” signal a sticky bit (a handshake) 
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Screenshot of Implementation for Design 
Placement
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Serial Scheme First Placement Serial Scheme Second Placement Parallel Scheme Optimized Placement
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Design Challenges
• Inability to simulate
• HDL Code Optimization
• Automated Data Collection
• Timing
• Design Placement
• Reset Logic in the Serial Scheme
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• Serial Entropy: 0.7963
www.scu.edu/engineering
• Parallel Entropy: 0.9253
Randomness Performance Results
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Metric Statistic Parallel Scheme Serial Scheme
Reliability Reliability Mean 99.65% 99.45%
Uniqueness Inter-Hamming Distance 
Mean
46.436% 62.702%
Randomness Shannon Entropy Mean 0.9253 0.7963
Evaluation
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Conclusion
• Our PUF is an effective method for uniquely characterizing 
chips
• Parallel Scheme is a prime benchmark to evaluate other 
schemes
• Serial scheme is not as random, reliable, or unique as 
parallel, but still performs well with much less area
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Paper Under Review
• A Systematic Approach for Internal Entropy Boosting in Delay-
based RO PUF on an FPGA
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Trinh, Wei Yan, and Fatemeh Tehranipoor
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